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ABSTRACT
A century ago, everyone thought time and distance were well defined physical concepts. But
neither proved absolute. Instead, measures/reports of time and distance were found to depend on
one’s reference point, specifically one’s direction and speed of travel, making our apparent physical
reality, in Einstein’s words, “merely an illusion.”
Like time and distance, standard fiscal measures, including deficits, taxes, and transfer
payments, depend on one’s reference point/reporting procedure/language/labels. As such, they too
represent numbers in search of concepts that provide the illusion of meaning where none exists.
This paper, dedicated to our dear friend, David Bradford, provides a general proof that
standard and routinely used fiscal measures, including the deficit, taxes, and transfer payments, are
economically ill-defined. Instead these measures reflect the arbitrary labeling of underlying fiscal
conditions. Analyses based on these and derivative measures, such as disposable income, private
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For David  
 
We are deeply honored to contribute to this volume in recognition of David Bradford.  
David was our very dear friend and mentor.  He was also our steadfast enthusiast, filling 
us full of encouragement and lauding us with overly generous praise.  David was a seeker 
of  core  truth,  and  his  marvelous  research  contributions  are  replete  with  fundamental 
insights that separate economic science from popular perception.   
 
David’s research interests overlapped with ours on a wide range of topics, none less than 
the  issue  considered  here,  namely  how  to  discuss  and  measure  fiscal  policy  in 
economically  meaningful  ways.    David  was  particularly  supportive  of  generational 
accounting,  whose  goal  is  to  compare  the  fiscal  treatment  of  current  and  future 
generations.  Indeed, David was a driving force behind the development of the first set of 
generational accounts.   
 
David’s laugh, spirit, spark, insight, and support continue to sustain us.  He has moved 
from the physical to the metaphysical, but his presence is no less real in our hearts, souls, 
and minds and will always be treasured.    
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
This paper provides a general proof that standard fiscal measures, including the deficit, 
taxes, and transfer payments, are economically ill-defined.  Instead these measures reflect 
the  arbitrary  labeling  of  underlying  fiscal  conditions.    Analyses  based  on  these  and 
derivative  measures,  such  as  disposable  income,  private  assets,  and  personal  saving, 
constitute the perusal of nomenclature, not the application of economics.  
 
The argument that any underlying fiscal policy can be reported as entailing any time path 
of  deficit,  taxes,  and  transfer  payments  and  that  these  measures  are,  economically 
speaking,  content-free  was  originally  advanced  by  Kotlikoff  (1986).    Auerbach  and 
Kotlikoff (1987) and Kotlikoff (2002) provide formal treatments of the point, but neither 
provide  a  general  proof  of  the  proposition.    This  paper  fills  this  gap.    It  posits  a 
competitive, contingent claims economy that can accommodate uncertainty, information 
asymmetries, distortions, externalities, public goods, time inconsistent policy, imperfect 
credit markets, and incomplete/segmented markets.  
 
 
II. The Model 
 
In what follows, there are K agents, N states, M goods, V firms, and H endowments.   
Goods include leisure.  Endowments include time, various types of physical capital, and 
natural resources.  As in Arrow (1964), a state of the world is defined by a particular date, 
a particular resolution of uncertainty, and a specification of all economically relevant 
variables.    The  terms  ps  and  qs  reference  pre-policy  producer  and  endowment  price 
vectors in state s.    
 
   2 
Profit Maximization 
 
There are V firms, which may be operated by private agents, the government, or both.  
Firm j’s profit is  
 
(1)  ), ( max j js s s js s s y
j m q y p
js
+ S - S º j p  
where yjs is firm j’s 1 x M vector of net goods supply in state s,  js j is firm j’s 1 x H vector 
of endowment demands, and mj is a function determining the government’s net payment 
to firm j.  Producers are atomistic and take producer prices, endowment prices, and their 
net payment functions as given.   
 




0 ) ,..., , ,..., , ,..., , ,..., ,..., ; ,..., , ,..., ( 1 1 1 1 , 1 1 1 = - - - - N N N jN j jN j jN j jN j j Z Z X X Y Y y y f w w j j j j
 
where Y-js is a 1 x M x (V-1) vector of net supplies of firms other than j in state s,  js - j  is a 
1 x H x (V-1) vector of state-s endowment demands of firms other than j, Xs references the 
1 x M x K vector of goods demanded by agents 1 through K in state s, Zs references the 1 
x M vector of goods demanded by the government in state s, and  s w references the 1 x H 
vector of economy-wide endowments in state s.   For future reference we denote by Ys the 
1 x M x V vector of net supplies of firms 1 through V in state s and by  s j the 1 x H x V 
vector of endowment demands of firms 1 through V.   
 
Including the Y-js’s,  js - j ’s, Xs’s, Zs’s,  s f ’s, and ￿s’s in (2) entertains the possibility of 
production  externalities,  consumption  externalities,  externalities  from  the  use  of 
economy-wide endowments, as well as externalities arising from the levels of economy-
wide endowments.    
 
Firm j’s net payment function, mj, may depend on its own state-specific net supplies of 
goods and demands for endowments.  But it may also depend on the state-specific net 
supplies and demands of other firms, the constellation of agents’ state-specific demands, 
the constellation of government state-specific demands for goods and endowments, and 
the economy’s overall endowments.  In other words, the firm’s net payment function may 
depend on any real variable in the economy.  This potential dependency, which may be 
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Let xis reference the 1 x M vector of goods demanded by agent i in state s, X-is reference 
the 1 x M x (K-1) vector of goods consumed by agents other than i in state s, and Zs 
reference the 1 x M vector of goods consumed by the government in state s.  The utility 
of agent i is given by 
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The arguments of these preferences accommodate consumer and producer externalities as 
well  as  externalities/public  goods  generated  by  producers’  and  government  demands.  
These arguments can also determine commodity characteristics, like average quality, that 
can be important determinants of demand and welfare in economies  characterized by 





The budget constraint of agent i is given by 
 
(5)  i is s s e x p = S , 
 
where ei is the net resource function of agent i.  The net resource function references the 
amount of resources the government arranges for agent i to be able to spend on state-
specific claims.  As indicated in (6), this function may depend not only on the agent’s 
own demand for claims in states of nature, but also on the claims of other agents, the 
production  of  each  firm,  the  government’s  state-specific  goods  demands,  and  the 
economy’s state-specific overall endowments.  This dependency may also be highly non-
linear. 
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In addition to (5), agent i’s demands are constrained by  
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Equation (7)  can  accommodate a variety of important restrictions on trade, including 






   4 
Market Clearing 
 
In  equilibrium  firms’  supplies  of  goods  in  each  state  s  must  cover  agents’  and 
government demands and the economy-wide supplies of endowments must cover firms’ 
endowment demands.  
 
(8)       s is i js j Z x y + S = S . 
 
(9)  js j s j w S = . 
 
 
The Government’s Budget 
 
Equations (1), (5), (8), and (9) imply 
 
(10)  j j i i j j s s s s s s m e q Z p S - S - S + S = S p w . 
 
The economy’s overall resources consist of the value of its overall endowments plus the 
value of pure profits.  These overall resources less the amount of net resources that the 
government  provides  to  agents  and  firms  must  finance  the  government’s  demand  for 






Government policy consists of a set of ei( ) and mj( ) functions as well as state-specific 
government product demand functions given by 
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In  equilibrium  households  maximize  (4)  subject  to  (5)  and  (7),  firms  maximize  (1) 
subject to (2), the government jointly chooses its mj( ), ei( ), and Zs( ) functions consistent 





Agent i’s net resources, ei, can be reported as reflecting the market value of a 1 x H 
vector of state-specific private endowments, ais, proportionate holdings of firm j of ￿ij, 
less a 1 x K vector of state- and good-specific net tax functions, ￿is, i.e.,   
   5 
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Since the elements ais and agent i’s reported share of firm profits will be described as 
constants, the ￿is functions must contain the same arguments as the ei function, i..e, 
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Note  that  in  equilibrium  endowment  and  producer  price  vectors  depend  on  the  same 
arguments as ￿is, namely X1,…,XN, Z1, …, ZN, Y1,…,YN, ￿1,…, ￿1, so there is no need to 
list them in (13) as separate arguments. 
 
Let ￿s reference a 1 x H vector of reported government endowments in state s.  Since 
endowments  are  held  either  by  agents  or  the  government,  reporting,  for  agent  i, 
endowments of ais in state s also requires, for consistency, announcing a government net 
endowment vector ￿s satisfying 
 
(14)  is i s s a S - = W w . 
 
Combining  (10),  (12),  and  (14)  yields  the  more  conventional  expression  for  the 
government’s budget, namely  
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references the government’s reported ownership share of firm j.  Equation (15) can be 
described as the government financing its goods and its net subsidies payments to firms 
from its net worth (the sum of the first two terms on the right-hand side of (15)) plus its 
net taxation of agents. 
 
Given an equilibrium, any party, be it a private agent or government official, is free to 
report  any  constellation  of  private  endowments  and  corresponding  government 
endowments she wants.  Assume, for example, that there is a single endowment, namely 
capital and that agent k reports private asset values of  is a ˆ  for i = 1,…, K and s = 1, …, N 
and private firm ownership shares  ij q ˆ .  Her corresponding announcement of government 
net tax payments by agent i in state s – denoted by  is tˆ , and government assets in state s, 
s W ˆ ,  must satisfy (17) and (18). 
   6 
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 (18)   is i s s a ˆ ˆ S - = W w . 
 
If agent k is a fiscal conservative (liberal) and is reassured by contemplating a large 
government surplus (debt) and low (high) taxes, she can simply declare very low (high) 
values of private assets,  is a ˆ , which will lead, according to (17) and (18) to high reported 
values of  s W ˆ  and low reported values of  is s s p tˆ S .   Thus the reported levels of these fiscal 
variables are completely undetermined as individual magnitudes, but they are linked to 
each other by (17) and (18).  In this sense these variables are mutually determined, but 
not individually determined.   As we discuss below, however, many economic analyses in 
macroeconomics  and  public  finance  have  used  the  levels  of  taxes  or  deficits  as 






Time is one of many characteristics of our model’s states of nature.  If we consider two 
states,  s￿  and  s￿  that  differ  with  respect  to  their  measure  of  time,  the  difference  in 
government  net  debt  (the  negative  of  government  assets)  between  the  two  states 
constitutes their intervening deficit.  Since one can report any size debt or surplus for 
states s￿ and s￿, one is free to report any size deficit (reduction in debt) across those two 
states and, indeed, across any two states that one wants.  Hence, each agent is free to 
concoct whatever deficit and associated net tax payment times series, past or present, that 
she wants.   
 
 
Tax and Transfer Payments 
 
Net taxes are defined as gross taxes minus transfer payments.  Given one’s reported level 
of net taxes, one can report any level of gross taxes minus a corresponding level of 
transfer payment.  Hence, gross taxes and transfer payments are just as ill defined as net 
taxes.  The same holds for any measures that rely  on  gross taxes and gross transfer 





There’s an old joke in which a husband claims to be in charge of his household.  As he 
puts it to his friends, “I make the important decisions – I determine our household’s 
foreign policy and let my wife handle everything else.”  Knowing who’s really in charge 
in a marriage is tough business, and determining who owns what can be even harder.  
Indeed, if the household resides in a community property state, it’s impossible to allocate 
ownership.  The husband and wife may have “separate” bank and other accounts, but   7 
neither can withhold the corpus of “their” accounts from the other.   Indeed, a variant of 
the quoted joke is “I own the money and my wife spends it.”   
 
The  private  sector  and  the  government  are  no  different  from  a  couple  living  under 
community property law.  They jointly own everything and jointly determine how to 
spend it.  Whether the government says a) “It’s all mine, but I’ll let you (the private 
sector) have some.” b) “It’s all yours, but I’ll take whatever I’d like.” or c) “It’s partly 
mine and partly yours, but I’ll determine how much of mine to give you and how much of 
yours to keep.” does not make an iota of economic difference.   
 
 
V.  Illustrating the Model 
 
The canonical model of government “debt” is Diamond’s (1965) two period life-cycle 
formulation.    We  now  show  how  the  above  general  formulation  accommodates  this 
model.  Agents are assumed to consume a single good and leisure when young and old.  
Labor supplied by young and old is homogeneous.  Output of the good, call it corn, is 
produced understand constant returns with capital and labor.  There is neither population 
nor  productivity  growth.    We  normalize  each  cohort’s  population  to  unity.  The 
endowment of time that can be used for work or leisure is 1 per generation per period. 
For simplicity, we assume the government makes no net payments to firms, but does have 
a demand for consumption of the economy’s single good.  
 
Let cyt, lyt, cot+1, and lot+1 stand, respectively, for consumption and leisure when young 
and old of the generation born at time t.   
 
The lifetime utility of the generation born at time t is given by 
 
(19)  ) , , , ( 1 1 , + + = ot ot yt t y t t l c l c u u  
 
Consider the economy as of time t=0.  The budget constraint facing the old at time 0 is 
given by  
 
(20)  0 0 0 0 o o o e l w c = + . 
 
For generations born at time t￿0, the budget constraint is given by  
 




























In (20) and (21) eo,0 stands for the remaining lifetime net resource function of the old at 
time 0, and et is the lifetime net resource function of the generation born at time t.  Each 
generation’s net resource function can depend freely and in a highly non-linear way on its 
consumption and leisure decisions.  And since each generation will consider how its   8 
consumption and leisure decisions affect its net resources both infra-marginally and at the 
margin, this formulation fully accommodates distortionary policy. 
 
The production function is 
 
(22)  ) , ( t t t L K F Y =  
 
The government’s demand for corn at time t is gt.  The economy’s endowment of capital 
evolves according to 
 
(23)  t ot yt t t t g c c Y K K - - - = - +1 . 
 
Labor supply is determined by 
 
(24)  ot yt t l l L - - = 2 . 
 
Using (22) and (24), rewrite (22) as  
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In hiring capital and labor, firms equate marginal factor products to pre-policy factor 
prices; i.e.,  
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In equilibrium the government announces a time-path of net resource functions – the 
terms eo0 and et -- and a time path of corn demand, gt, that satisfy (24) in each period 
given utility maximization subject to (19) and (20), and given the determination via (25) 





Suppose the economy is in dynamic equilibrium given government policy as determined 
by its net resource and spending functions.  Denote by an upper bar this equilibrium’s 
variables.  Now consider announcing/reporting any time-path of official debt¸  t D ˆ  starting 
at time 0.  If one reports  0 ˆ D as the amount of government debt prevailing at time 0, the 
corresponding report of private assets at time 0,  0 ˆ a , is determined by (26) for t=0.  The 
consistent report of net taxes facing the elderly at time 0,  0 ˆo t , is determined by (27).  The   9 
reported debt for time t>0 determines  t a ˆ from (26).  This determines  yt tˆ  from (28), and, 
given  yt tˆ , the reported value of  1 ˆ + ot t  is determined by (29). 
 
(26)  t t t K D a + = ˆ ˆ . 
 
(27)  0 0 0 0 0 ˆ ) 1 ( ˆ o o w r a e t - + + = . 
 






























Relationship to the General Formulation 
 
In the above example, (20) and (21) are specific cases of (5), (24) is a specific case of (8), 
and the equation of economy-wide capital and time endowments with firm demands for 
these endowments in (25) is a specific case of (9).   
 
Although we’ve presented this example assuming that all cohort members are identical, 
the example can readily be modified to include cohort-specific heterogeneity.  One need 
simply  apply  an individual-specific subscript to each of the cohort-specific variables.  
Doing so does not rule out anonymous net resource functions.  Subscripting net resources 
by an agent’s identity does not imply that the function determining those resources (as 
opposed to the arguments of the function) is agent-specific.  Hence, Mirrlees’ (1971) 
optimal income “tax” can be relabeled as freely as any other “tax,” with no alteration in 
his underlying optimal net resource function.  
 
 
A Second Illustration with Adverse Selection, and Credit Constraints 
 
Our second example, informed by Jaffee and Russel (1976) and Hayashi (1987), shows 
that the relativity of fiscal language is compromised neither by incomplete information, 
adverse selection, or credit constraints.   
 
Agents again live for two periods.  But each cohort now features two types of agents – A 
and B.  An agent’s type is private information.  Type B agents are honest.  They always 
repay what they owe, whether they owe payments to private parties or the government.  
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where for i  = A, B, 
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Note that for standard concave utility functions,  A Ay e c >
* . 
 
If type-A agents are permitted to consume more than 
*
Ay c  when young, the present value 
of their consumption will exceed their lifetime net resources. 
  
Denote  by  ^  the  utility  maximizing  value  of  iy c   and  io c .    Consider  a  separating 
equilibrium in which  
 
(32) 
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and  “financial”  and  “fiscal”  institutions  permit agents  to  set  their  consumption  when 
young  as  high  as 
*
yA c ,  but  no  higher.  Since  type  A  agents  are  indifferent  between 
consuming 
*
yA c  and consuming less than this amount, we assume they consume less.  In 
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The consumption of type A agents is given by  Ay c ˆ and  Ao c ˆ . 
 
Note that we have described this economy with no reference to “borrowing,” “taxes,” or 
“transfer payments.”  The budget constraint in (31) is a specific case of (5), and the 
constraint on agent B’s consumption when young and old in (33) is a specific case of (7).   
 
If we want, we can describe type-B agents as “facing high taxes when young, but being 
able to borrow large amounts” or as “facing low taxes, but being able to borrow small 
amounts.”   A “policy” of “raising current taxes” and “cutting future taxes” that leaves 
lifetime net resources unchanged can be described as engendering an increase in “private 




V.  Research and Policy Implications 
 
The fact that one can construct an infinite number of equally meaningless time series of 
government debt, deficits, taxes, transfer payments, private assets, private saving, and 
disposable  income  vitiates  a  vast  number  of  economic  analyses  predicated  on  these   11 
measures.  Recent examples include Gale and Orsag’s (2004) and Engen and Hubbard’s 
(2005) studies of the effects of budget deficits on interest rates, Bell and Bosworth’s 
(2005) study of the decline in personal saving, Banks, Blundell, Smith’s (2001) study of 
financial  wealth  inequality,  Slemrod’s  (1994)  study  of  tax  progressivity  and  income 
inequality, the OECD’s (1997) analysis of inequality in disposable income, the IMF’s 
study of fiscal policy and financial development (Hauner 2006), and the World Bank’s 
study of fiscal sustainability (Burnside, 2005). .  
 
The  failure  to  distinguish  economics  from  linguistics  also  undermines  theoretical 
research.    Consider,  for  example,  Barsky,  Mankiw,  and  Zeldes’  (1986)  paper  on 
Keynesian tax cuts.  Their policy entails a short-run across-the-board “tax cut” coupled 
with a long-run progressive “tax hike,” which is present value neutral in terms of the 
government’s net receipts.  The policy provides earnings insurance, which leads to more 
current consumption.  The authors suggest that this provides a neoclassical basis for the 
Keynesian view that tax cuts expand aggregate demand.   
 
In fact, it does no such thing since the policy could equally well be run/described/labeled 
as entailing a tax hike.  No doubt someone will someday write a paper arguing, from the 
perspective of this model, that a tax hike policy and a tax cut policy are equivalent.  This 
projected paper will add to the long list of papers purporting to identify  “equivalent 
policies” – policies that can be run/implemented differently, but that generate the same 
economic outcomes.  Such papers miss a central point.  There are no equivalent policies 
in neoclassical economics.  Policies are unique.  What’s different is simply the words we 
use to describe the same underlying policy.  
 
Fischer’s (1980) famous paper on the time inconsistency provides yet another example of 
the confusion of economics and language.  In Fischer’s two-period model agents fail to 
save out of fear of ex-post efficient, but ex-ante inefficient capital levies.  But from the 
perspective  of  the  second  period,  Fischer’s  capital  levy  is  no  different,  apart  from 
labeling, from a second-period infra-marginal labor income tax.  Were Fischer’s agents to 
adopt such a non-distortionary labor tax in their second period and also in their first, 
they’d achieve a first-best equilibrium.   
 
So why does Fischer conclude that his economy ends up in a third best equilibrium in 
which no one saves for fear of a capital levy? The answer is his assumption that only 
proportional labor income taxes may be levied/announced.  But this assumption is not 
based on any economic feature of his model.  Instead it boils down to a non-economic 
restriction on language since, from the perspective of the second period, a “capital levy” 
could just as well be called “an infra-marginal labor income tax.”  Fischer’s rational 
agents will surely realize this and also realize that if they can infra-marginally tax labor in 
the second period, they can do so in the first.  Having figured this out, they’ll end up in 
the first best.
1   
 
                                                 
1 Kotlikoff (2002) discusses both Barsky, Mankiw, and Zeldes (1986) and Fischer (1980).     12 
A third example of theoretical confusion over real policy and labels is the ubiquitous 
invocation of transversality conditions requiring that government debt grow, in the long 
run, no faster than the economy’s return on capital
2 and the presumption that economies 
that violate such conditions are dynamically inefficient.  As indicated here, there is no 
limit to the growth in reported debt time nor is there any economic association between 
the growth rate of reported debt and what matters for dynamic efficiency, namely the 
deviation between the growth rate of the economy and its return to capital.   
 
To see this in a less abstract framework, consider a dynamically efficient two period life-
cycle  model  with  a  zero  intrinsic  growth  rate.    Assume  the  economy  is  sitting  in  a 
stationary  state  with  a  positive  return  to  capital  of  r.    Also  assume  the  economy’s 
government  consumes  nothing  and  takes,  on  net,  nothing  from  any  generation  either 
when it’s young or when it’s old.  Now, starting at time 1, let’s label this policy as the 
government’s “borrowing m
th from each agent born at time t, making infra-marginal 
transfer payments of m
th to each agent born at time t, repaying principal plus interest of 
m
th(1+r) at time t+1 to each agent born at time t, and infra-marginally taxing at time t+1 
each agent born at time t in the amount m
th(1+r).”  This economy’s reported debt at the 
beginning of time t+1 is m
th.  If m>1, the economy’s debt and deficit will head to infinity 
with no affect whatsoever on the economy or any agent in the economy.
3   
 
Turning to actual policy, one need only consider the Maastricht Treaty limiting members 
of  the  EURO  to  3  percent  deficits,  the  Stability  and  Growth  Pact  that  sanctions  EU 
members with deficits above 3 percent, the IMF’s enduring use of the deficit to assess 
fiscal prudence, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act to limit U.S. deficits, or the ongoing 
movement  for  a  U.S.  balanced  budget  amendment  to  realize  that  official  reports  of 
deficits are a) dramatically influencing policy decisions and b) diverting attention from 





A  century  ago,  everyone  thought  that  time  and  distance  were  well  defined  physical 
concepts.    But  neither  proved  to  be  absolute.    Instead,  measures/reports  of  time  and 
distance  were  found  to  depend  on  one’s  direction  and  speed  of  travel  making  our 
apparent physical reality, in the words of Einstein, “merely an illusion.”  
 
Like time and distance, standard fiscal measures, including deficits, taxes, and transfer 
payments,  depend  on  one’s  reference  point/reporting  procedure/language/labels.    As 
such,  they  too  represent  numbers  in  search  of  concepts  that  provide  the  illusion  of 
meaning where none exists.  Economists must accept this fact and acknowledge that 
much of what they have been writing and saying about fiscal policy has been an exercise 
in linguistics, not economics.  
 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Blanchard (1985). 
3 If m<-1, the government’s surplus heads to infinity.  If -1<m<1, the government’s reports a declining debt 
or surplus through time.    13 
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